

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Main migration routes to and from Libya (to Italy and Greece)
Printing date: 31 May 2016 Sources: The map is produced based on the compilation of secondary data analysis from: UNHCR Libya, IOM (migration.iom.int/europe, Migrant Report
















Primary route, by road
Secondary route, by road
Main maritime route, from Libya
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Disembarkment and departure
point in Libya
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Mediterranean
Sea
Map Extent: Detailed zoom of the
disemberkation and departure points in Libya
The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on
this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the
United Nations.
The “routes” displayed on this map are only visual graphics and do
not reflect the real route path.
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ousts	their	regimes	without	international	intervention.	Now,	many	countries	that	experienced	
the	Arab	Spring	are	under	new,	authoritarian	regimes	that	are	also	repressive,	or	in	total	
disarray.	In	Syria,	the	Arab	Spring	turned	into	a	civil	war	with	the	hopes	of	NATO	intervention	to	
oust	Bashar	al-Assad.	However,	following	the	disaster	in	Libya,	NATO	did	not	intervene	in	Syria	
and	Syria	has	be	torn	apart	by	civil	war	ever	since.		
	 Although	NATO	intervened	with	strict	agenda	of	protecting	civilians,	following	the	death	
of	Gaddafi	and	the	end	of	OUP,	the	civilians	of	Libya	live	in	fear	due	to	the	continuous	factional	
fighting.	There	are	two	distinct	political	groups	vying	for	power,	and	four	armed	militias	
wreaking	havoc.	Power	in	Libya	is	now	split	between	the	east,	Tobruk,	and	the	west,	Tripoli.	In	
the	east,	the	government	is	ran	by	the	House	of	Representatives,	who	elected	Prime	Minister	
Abdullah	al-Thinni,	and	is	backed	by	Egypt	and	the	United	Arab	Emirates	(EFCR	2015).		Tripoli,	a	
city	in	western	Libya,	is	the	home	of	the	General	National	Congress,	a	house	of	representatives	
that	formed	in	reaction	to	the	relocation	of	the	Libyan	HOR,	and	its	own	prime	minister,	Omar	
al-Hassi	(2015).	Each	views	the	other	as	illegitimate	and	therefore	lacking	true	authority,	but	
the	true	power	in	Libya	belongs	to	Libya	Dawn	and	Haftar’s	Dignity	(2015).	The	power	of	
western	prime	minister	Khalifa	Ghwell,	successor	of	Hassi,	is	second	to	the	paramilitary	alliance	
of	armed	groups	that	exist	in	the	region	(2015).	The	government	of	al-Thinni	is	endorsed	by	the	
Dignity	operation.	The	Dignity	operation	has	a	centralized	command	under	Abdul	Razzaq	al-
Nadhuri,	but	tensions	arise	between	al-Nadhuri	and	other	eastern	officials	over	strategy,	
supplies,	and	future	plans	for	Libya.	While	these	groups	fight	over	political	control,	armed	
groups	reign	terror	on	all	of	Libya.	There	are	a	dozen	rebel	groups	in	Libya,	each	with	its	own	
agenda	and	weapons	base.	Most	notable	are	Libya	Dawn,	Libya	Shield,	Islamic	State,	and	Ansar	
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al-Sharia,	and	these	groups	have	been	known	to	harm	civilians	in	the	crossfires	(EFCR	2015).	
	
The	figure	on	the	previous	page	outlines	the	different	areas	of	Libya,	who	they	are	controlled	
by,	and	their	influence.	The	government	set	up	in	eastern	Libya	is	viewed	internationally	as	the	
government	of	Libya,	but	is	still	viewed	as	a	falling	government	as	the	country	has	yet	to	re-
unify	and	bring	peace	and	stability.		
	 An	important	distinction	that	is	often	left	out	of	the	analysis	of	the	events	that	led	to	
intervention	in	Libya	is	the	difference	between	civil	war	and	human	rights	violations.	Many	
critiques,	including	David	Gibbs,	emphasize	the	violence	that	was	inflicted	by	the	rebels,	not	the	
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regime.	Arguably,	the	rebels	fighting	the	regime	were	the	ones	who	instigated	a	violent	
response	from	Gaddafi,	rather	than	him	firing	on	protestors	first.	Also,	there	is	a	difference	
between	the	peaceful	protests	and	armed	rebels	besieging	government	buildings.	NATO	
intervention	into	Libya	served	as	a	means	to	topple	their	former	ally	and	give	the	rebels	the	
upper	hand	in	the	conflict.	Gibbs	describes	the	previous	relationship	between	the	West	and	
Gaddafi,	and	their	readiness	to	intervene	to	overthrow	him	after	an	extensive	relationship	that	
included	exchanging	military	equipment	and	intelligence	collaboration	(Gibbs	2011).	
Throughout	his	essay,	Gibbs	argues	that	the	West	intervened	in	Libya	on	the	basis	of	self-
interest	in	the	oil	industry	and	an	opportunity	to	show	Western	military	might.		
	 NATO	intervention	in	response	to	their	perceived	responsibility	to	protect	the	civilian	
population	of	Libya	has	led	to	the	chaos	that	causes	more	harm	for	the	civilian	populations.	
While	Libya	is	currently	a	failed	state,	dipping	low	on	the	human	rights	index,	and	a	source	of	
refugee	crisis,	Western	leaders	are	not	preparing	for	a	re-stabilization	operation.		
Application	of	thesis	
	 Unlike	Kosovo,	many	scholars	and	politicians	agree	that	NATO’s	intervention	into	Libya	
was	a	failure.	However,	they	draw	that	conclusion	because	unlike	in	Kosovo,	the	U.S.	did	
experience	casualties	as	a	result	of	this	intervention.	Often	referred	to	by	the	location	of	the	
attack,	Benghazi,	this	attack	resulted	in	the	death	of	four	American	diplomats.	This	attack,	and	
the	deaths	that	occurred	during,	caused	U.S.	public	support	for	intervention	in	Libya	to	
plummet	and	attributed	to	why	peacekeepers	were	not	left	in	the	region.	In	Kosovo,	
peacekeeping	troops	helped	stabilize	governance,	but	in	Libya	operations	ceased.	The	attacks	
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on	the	U.S.	government	facilities	were	conducted	by	a	branch	of	the	rebel	forces	that	NATO	had	
intervened	on	behalf	of.		
	 The	chaos,	and	failed	governance	of	Libya	post-Gaddafi	has	led	to	a	failed	state	in	Libya	
and	regional	disarray.	NATO	failed	to	facilitate	a	stable	governance	and	because	of	that	they	do	
not	meet	one	of	my	three	criteria	for	successful	intervention.	I	argue	that	eliminating	the	initial	
source	of	conflict	and	human	rights	violations	is	not	enough	to	ensure	the	prolong	safety	of	the	
civilian	population.	By	withdrawing	from	Libya	before	stabilizing,	the	civilian	population	has	
endured	the	terror	of	the	different	rebel	factions	fighting	throughout	the	country.	The	death	
toll	has	climbed	continuously	since	the	official	end	of	NATO’s	campaign,	but	the	humanitarian	
crisis	that	exists	now	has	not	enticed	the	UN	or	NATO	to	intervene	again.		
	 Intervention	in	Libya	also	failed	to	protect	the	civilian	populations.	NATO	strikes	
attributed	to	civilian	deaths,	and	although	the	numbers	vary	depending	on	the	source,	the	
Human	Rights	Watch	report	examines	eight	strikes	that	resulted	in	the	death	of	72	civilians.	
However,	civilian	deaths	due	to	NATO	intervention	are	higher	than	those	caused	by	Gaddafi’s	
oppression	of	the	protestors.	While	it	was	difficult	finding	documentation	regarding	the	
amount	of	deaths	that	resulted	due	to	the	backlash	of	Gaddafi’s	region	following	the	Arab	
Spring	protests,	there	was	plenty	of	evidence	and	stipulation	that	Gaddafi	did	not	attack	the	
protestors	first	nor	instigated	more	violence.	The	violence	that	has	now	been	caused	by	the	
rebels	has	been	more	harmful	than	the	attempts	for	Gaddafi	to	regain	control	of	the	country.		
		 In	order	to	remove	the	negative	stigma	associated	with	humanitarian	intervention,	I	
argue	that	interventionists	need	to	be	wary	of	the	consequences	of	negligence	and	avoid	
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causing	civilian	casualties.	According	the	Human	Rights	Watch	report,	the	strikes	that	resulted	
in	civilian	deaths	were	surrounded	with	ambiguity	and	incomplete	information.	Instead	of	
brushing	off	the	civilian	causalities	as	collateral	damage,	NATO	should	be	held	responsible	for	
the	damage	that	was	not	military	objectives.		
	 With	Libya	being	a	failed	state,	continuous	civil	war,	and	a	refugee	crisis	that	has	added	
to	the	chaos,	the	humanitarian	intervention	was	a	failure	and	an	example	of	what	not	to	do.		
Conclusion	
There	is	little	scholarly	debate	about	whether	or	not	intervention	into	Libya	failed	
miserably.	While	I	draw	the	same	conclusion,	I	do	so	through	my	criteria	and	understanding	of	
what	it	means	to	carry	out	a	successful	humanitarian	intervention	campaign.	While	the	NATO	
forces	caused	less	civilian	casualties	upfront,	their	actions	destabilized	the	country	and	caused	a	
continuing	humanitarian	crisis.	Currently,	there	are	several	rebel	factions	vying	for	power,	
smugglers,	traffickers,	and	terrorist	have	made	their	permanent	home	in	Libya,	and	civilians	
lives	are	torn	apart	by	the	never	ending	violence.	For	these	reasons,	the	NATO	campaign	failed	
to	meet	two	of	my	three	criteria	for	a	successful	intervention.		
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Chapter	four:	Conclusion	
Throughout	this	thesis	I	have	argued	that	to	carry	out	a	successful	humanitarian	
intervention	it	must	be	legal,	prevent	civilian	causalities,	and	facilitate	the	creation	of	a	stable	
government.	By	adhering	to	my	criteria,	I	believe	future	interventions	would	have	less	negative	
consequences	because	it	would	limit	destruction,	be	internationally	supported,	and	lead	to	the	
emergence	of	a	new,	stable,	and	successful	government.		
To	ensure	legality,	any	force,	whether	it	be	an	alliance	such	as	NATO,	or	a	single	state	
intervening	in	another,	must	receive	UN	Security	Council	approval.	Intervening	in	a	sovereign	
state	without	Security	Council	approval	is	illegal	under	international	law,	and	acting	outside	the	
law	sets	the	precedent	that	states	can	invade	simply	on	the	pretense	of	human	rights	
violations.	By	abiding	by	the	international	laws	established	under	the	UN	Charter,	I	believe	it	
would	lead	to	further	international	cooperation	because	all	military	interventions	would	be	
viewed	unilaterally	as	legitimate.		
Adhering	to	the	legal	precedent	already	established	prevents	the	slippery	slope	effect	in	
regards	to	humanitarian	intervention.	If	other	countries	adopted	the	Responsibility	to	Protect,	
they	would	be	able	to	invade	their	foes	with	less	restraints.	While	the	U.S.	has	its	notion	of	
human	rights	violations	and	points	fingers	at	other	state’s	extreme	practices,	many	states	
believe	the	U.S.	violates	human	rights	by	allowing	the	death	penalty.	If	NATO	continues	to	
violate	sovereignty	under	the	pretense	of	human	rights,	they	could	be	opening	the	door	for	
other	states	to	do	the	same.	In	order	to	prevent	this	slippery	slope,	NATO	needs	to	be	restricted	
by	the	international	laws	they	claim	to	be	defending.		
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Limiting	civilian	causalities	is	included	as	one	of	my	criteria	for	success	because	causing	
death	to	noncombatants	while	waging	war	to	prevent	further	humanitarian	crisis	is	
counterproductive	and	delegitimizes	the	campaign.	By	acting	with	restraint	and	caution,	I	
believe	the	intervening	force	will	not	cause	more	harm	than	necessary	because	they	will	be	
thinking	of	the	long-term	ramifications	of	their	actions.	I	also	believe	that	if	civilian	lives	are	
prioritized,	diplomatic	means	of	peaceful	solutions	will	become	more	important	and	utilized.		
Finally,	I	think	the	true	determinate	of	success	is	the	long-term	stabilization,	success,	
and	prosperity	of	the	nation	that	was	intervened	in.	By	aiding	the	new	government	in	creating	
and	administering	law	and	order,	the	humanitarian	mission	will	end	with	an	effort	to	prevent	a	
new	crisis.	If	efforts	had	been	made	to	stabilize	Libya,	thousands	of	refugees	would	not	be	
pouring	into	the	coasts	of	Europe.	By	facilitating	the	growth	and	integrity	of	new	governments,	
NATO	is	expanding	its	network	of	allies	while	honoring	the	goal	of	their	missions:	protecting	
human	rights.	Without	a	government	monitoring	and	protecting	the	human	rights	of	its	
populations,	chaos	and	terror	ensues.		
Not	to	be	confused	with	state	building,	my	vision	for	the	future	of	humanitarian	
intervention	is	peace	keeping	forces,	whether	supplied	by	the	UN,	NATO	or	an	individual	
country,	being	present	during	the	uneasy	transition	from	revolution	to	rebuilding.	History	
shows	repeatedly	that	after	a	revolution,	chaos	erupts	as	competing	factions	vie	for	power.	
Instead	of	operating	a	military	campaign	to	topple	the	oppressor	and	then	immediately	
withdrawing,	I	believe	that	those	who	intervened	on	behalf	of	human	rights	violations	should	
remain	for	a	minimum	of	6	months	to	act	as	a	mediator,	protector,	and	neutral	presence	in	
case	of	further	violence.	I	do	not	envision,	or	support,	the	notion	of	these	peace	keeping	forces	
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swaying	the	restructuring	of	a	state.	Instead,	I	support	the	idea	of	preventing	the	chaos	and	
disarray	present	in	Libya	from	occurring	following	future	revolutions.		
The	topic	of	humanitarian	intervention,	and	limiting	the	damages	it	inflicts,	is	
increasingly	important	as	the	world	becomes	more	globalized.	Through	advanced	
communication	networks	and	the	interdependence	of	states,	a	humanitarian	crisis	is	become	
less	a	regional	issue	but	a	global	one.	Currently,	the	world	is	seeing	the	effects	of	a	regional	
humanitarian	crisis	on	the	international	community.	The	refugee	crisis	that	began	in	the	Middle	
East	and	Africa	is	now	affecting	the	policies	of	countries	around	the	world.	As	civil	wars	and	
violent	regime	changes	continue	to	shape	developing	countries,	I	believe	redefining,	limiting,	
and	reimagining	humanitarian	intervention	is	important.		
The	Syrian	Civil	War	is	presently	ripping	apart	Syria	and	negatively	affecting	its	
neighboring	countries.	As	debate	swirls	regarding	the	future	course	of	action,	instead	of	relying	
on	traditional,	flawed,	methods	of	humanitarian	intervention,	I	believe	a	new	alternative	should	
be	considered.	Through	my	analysis	of	Kosovo	and	Libya,	I	concluded	that	brute	military	
strength	against	a	lesser	developed	country	in	the	name	of	human	rights	is	counterproductive.	
The	large-scale	bombs	that	are	routinely	dropped	cause	substantial	damage	to	the	
infrastructure	of	the	countries,	ruin	urban	centers,	cause	causalities,	and	force	people	out	of	
their	homes.		
Moving	forward,	and	looking	back,	I	think	humanitarian	intervention	should	be	less	
militarized	and	more	humanitarian.	Before	states	used	their	militaries	to	protect	human	rights,	
the	ICRC	was	working	to	aid	and	protect	all	victims	of	war.	I	suggest	that	civilian	entities	are	
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better	for	providing	humanitarian	aid	and	assistance	and	should	be	used	rather	than	military	
campaigns.	I	understand	the	need	for	protection,	and	I	would	not	except	an	aid	operation	to	be	
conducted	without	any	protection	unit,	but	those	units	should	only	be	utilized	as	a	
protectionary	caution,	instead	of	as	an	invading	force.	By	coming	into	an	already	conflicted	area	
peacefully,	instead	of	inflicting	more	damage,	the	humanitarian	workers	would	be	there	to	
prevent	it.		
I	believe	that	the	future	of	humanitarian	intervention	does	not	coincide	with	use	of	
military	force,	but	rather	actual	humanitarian	relief.	There	will	always	be	conflict	in	the	world,	
but	in	order	to	limit	the	scope	and	damage	of	these	conflicts	there	must	be	a	new	course	of	
action.			
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